Introduction
Walter begins by introducing a brief history of the meme - the cultural counterpart to the gene - introduced as a concept by Dawkins in 1976 and latterly by Lumsden and Wilson in 1981 repackaged as culturgen.
Walter questions whether the meme is useful or adequate in accounting for culture. Critics argue that culture can't be determined the same way that genes can. Walter states that replacing meme theory with culturgen theory will not increase understanding of cultural transmission. How is culture conceptualised, he asks?
Dawkin's definition of a meme is described by Distin as a 'unit of information residing in the brain' that is dependent on representational context. It includes ideas, skills, concepts and procedures that are replicated from one mind to another by way of communication (e.g. farming methods). The external consequences of that unit of information define observable behaviour (phenotypic effects). Walter states that all ideas that have the potential to be transmitted qualify as memes. Ideas that are possible but are not used are referred to as recessive memes. Ideas that are useful will be transmitted. Emotions cannot be counted as memes as they have no representational content. Instead, we are encouraged to think of emotions as reactions to memes. Walter specifically states "[t]he mental representations of other species, and possibly earlier hominid species, also do not qualify as memes. For example, frog representations of flies do not count as memes. In order to qualify, representations have to be sufficiently abstract" (p. 5).
Distin believes that only modern man is capable of understanding representations of representations (meta-representations) and uses simian behaviour as an example. An ape may pull leaves off a twig to fish for termites but does not consider the twig a tool for that purpose. The former is learned behaviour or instrumental behaviour. The latter is a formation of the abstract conceptualisation 'ant dipper'. What is crucial is that the concept can be detached and placed in abstract with other context independent concepts. For example, icanhascheezburger is a meme that uses the concept of animal activity and human thought process to create humour. Dawkins proposed that culture does not solely consist of meta-representations, but culture can be defined by the significant use of such representations.
Walter indicates that complex learning can be achieved through mindless mimicry, but Distin argues that rules are required to structure memes, and social learning is vital to memetic transmission. So only representation that involves social learning is considered to be a meme. Blackmore indicates that cultural transmission occurs through imitation. Distin identifies three kinds of imitation:
- imitation of the surface form of the behaviour;
- imitation of the complex structure of behaviour (distinguishing between component parts of behavioural patterns and those that are identified as reciprocal); and
- imitation formulated in terms of rules or general principles (e.g. recipes).
Critics argue that units of information represented in individuals are not identical to each other. Walter cites Sperber who proposes that three conditions should be met:
- A must cause B;
- A must be identical to B; and
- B must be inherited from A.
It is suggested that individuals cannot perceive the world as it truly is, nor are we perceiving an ideal platonic reality. We create our world through conscious experience, and Distin refers to the meme as an example of Platonic essence. To construct identical instantiations would require conceptualisation through Platonic essences. The categorisation of memes defines its' class. Each representation in individual brains is the experience or units of information that have been received. Walters states that even though individuals gather information from the same source (identity of stimulations), it does not guarantee identity of content. Abstraction of information depends upon individual focus within context.
Similarities that occur in brain events can be measured statistically, Walter indicates. Distin proposes that statistical variations in memes are due to distortions and omissions ('noise'). The ellimination of noise allows the individual to access the true essence of the meme. It is generally accepted that diversity in representations indicates that ideas are not the same as essences. There is undeniable variation in biological systems, Walter states, and messy, empirical variation constitutes Darwin's Dangerous Idea that renders indoctrination in biology and zoology void. Walter refers to Oyama who critiqued the notion that information is passed through DNA and suggests instead that a 'ghost in the gene' exists. Distin applies this reasoning to memes suggesting that information is the 'ghost in the meme'. Genes are representations of observable behaviour through the medium of DNA while memes are representative of the cultural traits. Walter suggests the critical difference is that genes have a specific value that allows copying and memes do not. He adds that genes have a physical manifestation that enable transfer from source to recipient, whereas behaviour generated by thinking is not a shared activity between brains. Memes are the imaginary bridge that connect us.
We know that memes are part of a larger more complex meme, so Walter asks what constitutes learning when nothing is physically transmitted to the brain. What would happen to memetics if we learned without regard for traditional concepts that were originally meant to teach us skills essential to society?
The Richerson and Boyle Variations
Walter investigates an alternative to memetics. Richerson and Boyle indicate information to be a mental state that affects behaviour and is achieved through learning (behaviour includes ideas, beliefs, values, attitudes). Research into the spread and disappearance of cultural variants (unit of culture) will help monitor transmission of the learning process. Walter quotes "culture is taught by motivated teachers, acquired by motivated learners, and stored and manipulated in brains" (pg. 9). Richerson and Boyle simply state that adopting a Darwinian approach to culture is useful when considering cultural variants and their potential similarity to genes.
The differences between Richerson and Boyle's alternative is that cultural variants are not replicators and the particulate claim does not apply when held against Sperber's objections. Rather than being information transmitted from one brain to another, cultural variants generate behaviour that is observed and replicated, "... a population of similar but not identical learned representations" (pg.10).
Cultural Selection and Social Learning
Richerson and Boyd insist that cultural variants are transmitted through what Walter views as social learning methods. Imitation is prevalent among all species, but social learning is highly developed in humans. Richerson and Boyd make the crucial distinction between learning and imitation. Furthermore, they hypothesise the following valuation: if learning is cheap, people will learn; if learning is expensive, imitation will ensue.
Walter makes clear the difference between natural selection and biased transmission. Natural selection is when a predominant culture can have an effect that changes the cultural composition of the population. Biased transmission are cultural variants that are selected for imitation and passed on.
Our culture is unique in that we are the only species to pass down innovation carried by multiple generations. Our learning is cumulative and instead of re-inventing the wheel every generation, we learn from mistakes and successes made in the environment without having to approach it from a basic foundation. Richerson and Boyd argue that imitation facilitates cumulative improvement (time not spent re-inventing the wheel).
So what's the difference between the two, Walter asks. Richerson and Boyd's hypothesis is that early man developed his brain through cultural benefits derived from imitation. Environments that are extremely unstable (variable) are unable to pass on information that is retained in the long term. Mal-adaptive or adverse behaviour is common because of social learning. New non-parental models leave individuals open to manipulation and exploitation unlike traditional parental models. Stable environments (thousands of generations) produce development or evolution. Social learning (a.k.a cultural adaptation) occurs in variable environments that change slowly. Richerson and Boyd add that it is a mistake to reflect on behavioural ecology without considering cultural environment. Farming methods in diverse communities vary irrespective of physical similarities. Richerson and Boyd believe that cultural tradition explains why methods are used and learned by succeeding generations better than ecological contingency can.
Operant Conditioning by any other name ...
Walter believes that there are important consequences that result as a matter of course in relating cultural evolution to biological evolution. Skinner's perspective recognises that there exist "genetically evolved dimensions that underlie behaviour" (pg. 13). He also believed that although cultural selection differed from natural selection, "no new behavioural process" (pg. 13) was involved suggesting cultural evolution is based on operant conditioning (where behaviour is rewarded or punished for each action until it is associated with either a positive or negative experience). Walter quotes from work Skinner published in 1953: "the culture into which an individual is born is composed of all the variables affecting him which are arranged by other people" (pg. 14). There are elementary processes by which behavioural repertoires develop. Responses may be shaped by social and/or physical environment. Conformity requires regulation of contributed standards to develop a self-sustaining social system.
The chimera of representational content
Skinner states that mental events can be explained and accepted as brain behaviour. It is considered a possibility that concepts of folk psychology (memes of past generations that include beliefs and desires) may be replaced with neurological assertions.
Cognitive theory on dualism stipulate that mental events exist and are represented in separate physical brain events. The materialist asks is it possible to describe brain events in a manner that circumvents the notion that a non-physical dimension exists? Walter notes the difficulty in understanding dualism may lie in articulation because links we use include both psychological and physical terms to determine the experience. Critics argue that it is a new metaphor for connection to describe cognitive process.
The era for representational fantasies of cognitive scientists is over, Walter indicates. Theories based on operational behaviour that link definition to consequence are required. While non-cognitive learning theory is doing this, Walter indicates that Richerson and Boyd are muddying the waters in their exploration of cultural variants.
If the metaphor doesn't fit, don't wear it
Walter suggests that metaphors are by and large unhelpful and views them as distracting and irrelevant. He argues the point by introducing the debate on whether some memes are like viruses (e.g. pernicious effects of religion). Distin argues against the virus concept as memes do not replicate the way that genes do, so there is nothing to hijack. Richerson and Boyd defend the virus as a rogue cultural variant - a self-perpetuating meme that is socially undesirable.
Walter categorises the division of labour between scientists this way: evolutionary biologists/psychologists investigate evolutionary history for proximate mechanisms of behaviour. Neurobiologists and psychologists of learning and conditioning are obliged to investigate how proximate mechanisms function. To determine the nature of what drives and constrains learning requires different tools (mental models, perspectives, etc.). Operant conditioning tools cannot answer why a thing is, or what in evolutionary history or physiology reinforces mechanisms.
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