Personal Philosophies of Teaching: A False Promise?

Daniel Pratt: Personal Philosophies of Teaching: A False Promise?
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/academe/2005/JF/Feat/pratt.htm


Introduction
New regulations require teachers to have prepared a personal philosophy of teaching when being reviewed for re-appointment.  Pratt indicates that the core of these statements contain two ideologies that the review panel should be open to:

1. more than one teaching philosophy; and
2. serious consideration of said philosophy.

Pratt's argument questions the validity of the institution's request, and the method by which teachers collate their philosophy.  He indicates there are four basic assumptions to be made:

• the agreement on form and substance as to what constitutes a good teaching philosophy (a consensus exists as to the form and substance of a statement of teaching philosophy).  Universities prey on other institution's policies (policies based on faculty value statements that were more descriptive than analytical) to bootleg their own version.  Pratt considers the approach fraught with error.  He suggests the statements were not considered analytical because personal teaching pedagogy was not accounted for - the shortfall between individual teaching practice and personal philosophy "do as I say, not as I do".  Theory is certain only in that it is a theory.  Without actually having experience of practising philosophy, it is not possible for the educator to develop a statement of self.  From this perspective, Pratt considers the distribution of such policies to be of no value.
• the statements are 'learner centred' (acceptable philosophies of teaching are learner-centred).  Pratt challenges the idea that learner-centredness has the same meaning globally.  He uses teaching practices in China as an example: where teachers are in full mastery of knowledge and control.  Students accept this and submit to reciprocal roles.  Pratt's concerns focus on the lack of acknowledgement given to the variety of ways in which learner centredness is culturally expressed, and the subsequent effective teaching practices that account for and direct the learner.
• the reviewers are not biased against alternative philosophies (the reviewers' own philosophies of teaching will not prejudice them against other philosophies of teaching).  There is unspoken assumption that the review panel made up of peers are the best judges of the discipline, Pratt indicates.  However he is concerned that the panel do not receive any guidance or policy to respond to challenging statements, or statements that do not reflect panel philosophy.
• students are able to assess and evaluate the plurality of philosophies (student evaluations of teaching will have fair regard for a plurality of acceptable philosophies of teaching).  Most universities gather student assessment via questionnaires.  Pratt argues that these questionnaires have not been critically evaluated to establish the value of knowledge acquired, nor to reflect the differences that student evaluations place on teaching practice.

Pratt concludes by saying that it his experience not to have found a single good philosophy that dominates over others, but that there is a balance to be found between 'anything goes' and 'one size fits all'.  He does point out that in this climate some educators, in an effort to comply quickly, do not have the time to consider the policies they are bootlegging.