Jahoda, G. (2002). The ghosts in the meme machine. History of the Human Sciences, 15(22), pp. 55-68. Retrieved on 16th May, 2010 from http://hhs.sagepub.com
Introduction
Jahoda introduces us to Susan Blackmore who wrote The Meme Machine in 1999. Jahoda links Decartes dualism "not only animals but also humans are mere machines" (pg. 2) to Blackmore's work "humans are mere creatures of entities known as 'memes'" (pg. 2). Jahoda indicates both pieces of work generated similar impact.
History is important when reflecting on evolution. Darwinism was a significant influence on the work produced during the late 19th and early 20th century, but receded in importance after the first world war. Environmentalism became the metaphor, and behaviourism the focus. Behaviourists were superceded by cognitivism. Cognitivism split into two strands (bifurcated) with one strand looking into meaning, and the second taking account of neurophysiology, renewing interest in evolution and Darwin. Subsequent discoveries (genes) have lifted this issue above understanding of the 19th century. Social evolution is known as cultural evolution. The key question according to Jahoda concerns the link between cultural and genetic evolution. To understand culture given the varying global representations available, smaller units of information called memes are used.
Jahoda describes the current ethos as tending towards a "rigidly mechanical conception of genetic evolution" (pg. 3). Within the debate of genetic and cultural evolution is a dichotomy, Jahoda states. More research is needed to explore mechanical and organic selection. Different interpretations of Darwinism leave room for influence in genetic evolution. Since Darwin, Jahoda notes that language has become metaphorical.
Dawkin's work on the Selfish Gene takes the view that genes compete with other genes to transmit information. Genes are known as replicators and survival constitutes the basis of evolution. Human culture can be seen as a "soup" (pg. 4) where one unit of cultural transmission can be viewed as one unit of imitation. Dawkins suggests memes propagate by jumping from brain to brain, also known as imitation. Different and conflicting memes struggle to dominate and influence our intellect which indicates that without cultural pressure memes can be ignored (e.g. think about the way catch phrases are transmitted - when read and repeated by another, a meme is formed; but if it is read and not repeated they remain paradoxically phenotypes).
Some classical writings on imitation and social life
After Aristotle, Jahoda identifies Erasmus Darwin (grandfather to Charles), "a free thinking physician and poet" (pg. 5). Research from 1963 indicates that Darwin, E. proposed his own theory of evolution which Jahoda believes to be quite modern. E. Darwin believed that imitation is key to supporting human social life because imitation gives rise to the origin of all social bonds - sympathy. From childhood onwards, man is essentially imitative. Education and the history of civilisation rely on this. Other literature (1877-2000) covers imitation extensively ranging from the animal world (e.g. ant colonies) to world history. Individualistic views generated some ill-tempered debates. Jahoda quotes Baldwin, 1897: "Everything that is learnt is copied, reproduced, assimilated, from one's fellows" (pg. 8). Imitation and innovation can't be separated as they are integral parts of the same cycle. Baldwin proposed a new factor in evolution - that evolutionary direction is integral to intellectual capacity and conscious awareness. Learned behaviours can become instinctive.
Some striking echoes from the past
Blackmore indicates that imitation is not conscious or deliberate. Songs are memes. Lyrics influence individuals. Music has been banned through the ages. Mathematical models have been constructed to demonstrate how ideas from external environments develop much like language. Ideas compete with each other for ascendancy to avoid diminished consciousness. Without regular activation, thoughts disappear.
When is a metaphor more than a metaphor?
Jahoda explores the concept of competition between memes and questions if aggression is to be taken literally or metaphorically. When do memes stop being thought of as active agents and become active agents? Consistent view is that humans are active agents who invent, innovate and imitate but not necessarily in a conscious and deliberate manner. Metaphors are correct but not accurate in nature, Jahoda argues. There is nothing wrong with metaphors per se if they can be translated back "into literal discourse" (pg. 12).
Jahoda quotes Blackmore "the real driving force behind [progress] is the interest of the memes" (pg. 12) . Jahoda reveals Blackmore's indication that intention has been transferred to the memes. As indicated previously, memes achieve nominal success through cultural pressure to conform and can go ignored.
Concluding comments
Jahoda questions how Blackmore's work has reasonably added to fundamental advances in genetics. Comparisons between other theories reveal it is generally accepted that there is a vast pool of memes in society. Some are selected for imitation. Selection does not imply conscious or deliberate action. However, while many commentators have based their work on some element of social and biological processes, Jahoda notes that differences stem from Blackmore's view favouring memes as active and humans as passive. Baldwin's comments that link imitation and suggestion implying that humans have active roles were not addressed by Blackmore. Invention and creation of novelty generates imitation, but does it mean that older theories that treat humans as active agents are better grounded?
Showing posts with label memes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label memes. Show all posts
19 May, 2010
Walter, A. (2007). Biology and social life: book review/Biologie et vie sociale: note de lecture: The trouble with memes: deconstructing Dawkin's monster: An Essay Review of the Selfish Meme: A Critical Reappraisal by Kate Distin and Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution by Peter J. Richerson and Robert Boyd.
Walter, A. (2007). Biology and social life: book review/Biologie et vie sociale: note de lecture: The trouble with memes: deconstructing Dawkin's monster: An Essay Review of the Selfish Meme: A Critical Reappraisal by Kate Distin and Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution by Peter J. Richerson and Robert Boyd. Social Science Information, 46(691). Retrieved on May 16, 2010 from http://ssi.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/46/4/691
Introduction
Walter begins by introducing a brief history of the meme - the cultural counterpart to the gene - introduced as a concept by Dawkins in 1976 and latterly by Lumsden and Wilson in 1981 repackaged as culturgen.
Walter questions whether the meme is useful or adequate in accounting for culture. Critics argue that culture can't be determined the same way that genes can. Walter states that replacing meme theory with culturgen theory will not increase understanding of cultural transmission. How is culture conceptualised, he asks?
Dawkin's definition of a meme is described by Distin as a 'unit of information residing in the brain' that is dependent on representational context. It includes ideas, skills, concepts and procedures that are replicated from one mind to another by way of communication (e.g. farming methods). The external consequences of that unit of information define observable behaviour (phenotypic effects). Walter states that all ideas that have the potential to be transmitted qualify as memes. Ideas that are possible but are not used are referred to as recessive memes. Ideas that are useful will be transmitted. Emotions cannot be counted as memes as they have no representational content. Instead, we are encouraged to think of emotions as reactions to memes. Walter specifically states "[t]he mental representations of other species, and possibly earlier hominid species, also do not qualify as memes. For example, frog representations of flies do not count as memes. In order to qualify, representations have to be sufficiently abstract" (p. 5).
Distin believes that only modern man is capable of understanding representations of representations (meta-representations) and uses simian behaviour as an example. An ape may pull leaves off a twig to fish for termites but does not consider the twig a tool for that purpose. The former is learned behaviour or instrumental behaviour. The latter is a formation of the abstract conceptualisation 'ant dipper'. What is crucial is that the concept can be detached and placed in abstract with other context independent concepts. For example, icanhascheezburger is a meme that uses the concept of animal activity and human thought process to create humour. Dawkins proposed that culture does not solely consist of meta-representations, but culture can be defined by the significant use of such representations.
Walter indicates that complex learning can be achieved through mindless mimicry, but Distin argues that rules are required to structure memes, and social learning is vital to memetic transmission. So only representation that involves social learning is considered to be a meme. Blackmore indicates that cultural transmission occurs through imitation. Distin identifies three kinds of imitation:
Critics argue that units of information represented in individuals are not identical to each other. Walter cites Sperber who proposes that three conditions should be met:
It is suggested that individuals cannot perceive the world as it truly is, nor are we perceiving an ideal platonic reality. We create our world through conscious experience, and Distin refers to the meme as an example of Platonic essence. To construct identical instantiations would require conceptualisation through Platonic essences. The categorisation of memes defines its' class. Each representation in individual brains is the experience or units of information that have been received. Walters states that even though individuals gather information from the same source (identity of stimulations), it does not guarantee identity of content. Abstraction of information depends upon individual focus within context.
Similarities that occur in brain events can be measured statistically, Walter indicates. Distin proposes that statistical variations in memes are due to distortions and omissions ('noise'). The ellimination of noise allows the individual to access the true essence of the meme. It is generally accepted that diversity in representations indicates that ideas are not the same as essences. There is undeniable variation in biological systems, Walter states, and messy, empirical variation constitutes Darwin's Dangerous Idea that renders indoctrination in biology and zoology void. Walter refers to Oyama who critiqued the notion that information is passed through DNA and suggests instead that a 'ghost in the gene' exists. Distin applies this reasoning to memes suggesting that information is the 'ghost in the meme'. Genes are representations of observable behaviour through the medium of DNA while memes are representative of the cultural traits. Walter suggests the critical difference is that genes have a specific value that allows copying and memes do not. He adds that genes have a physical manifestation that enable transfer from source to recipient, whereas behaviour generated by thinking is not a shared activity between brains. Memes are the imaginary bridge that connect us.
We know that memes are part of a larger more complex meme, so Walter asks what constitutes learning when nothing is physically transmitted to the brain. What would happen to memetics if we learned without regard for traditional concepts that were originally meant to teach us skills essential to society?
The Richerson and Boyle Variations
Walter investigates an alternative to memetics. Richerson and Boyle indicate information to be a mental state that affects behaviour and is achieved through learning (behaviour includes ideas, beliefs, values, attitudes). Research into the spread and disappearance of cultural variants (unit of culture) will help monitor transmission of the learning process. Walter quotes "culture is taught by motivated teachers, acquired by motivated learners, and stored and manipulated in brains" (pg. 9). Richerson and Boyle simply state that adopting a Darwinian approach to culture is useful when considering cultural variants and their potential similarity to genes.
The differences between Richerson and Boyle's alternative is that cultural variants are not replicators and the particulate claim does not apply when held against Sperber's objections. Rather than being information transmitted from one brain to another, cultural variants generate behaviour that is observed and replicated, "... a population of similar but not identical learned representations" (pg.10).
Cultural Selection and Social Learning
Richerson and Boyd insist that cultural variants are transmitted through what Walter views as social learning methods. Imitation is prevalent among all species, but social learning is highly developed in humans. Richerson and Boyd make the crucial distinction between learning and imitation. Furthermore, they hypothesise the following valuation: if learning is cheap, people will learn; if learning is expensive, imitation will ensue.
Walter makes clear the difference between natural selection and biased transmission. Natural selection is when a predominant culture can have an effect that changes the cultural composition of the population. Biased transmission are cultural variants that are selected for imitation and passed on.
Our culture is unique in that we are the only species to pass down innovation carried by multiple generations. Our learning is cumulative and instead of re-inventing the wheel every generation, we learn from mistakes and successes made in the environment without having to approach it from a basic foundation. Richerson and Boyd argue that imitation facilitates cumulative improvement (time not spent re-inventing the wheel).
So what's the difference between the two, Walter asks. Richerson and Boyd's hypothesis is that early man developed his brain through cultural benefits derived from imitation. Environments that are extremely unstable (variable) are unable to pass on information that is retained in the long term. Mal-adaptive or adverse behaviour is common because of social learning. New non-parental models leave individuals open to manipulation and exploitation unlike traditional parental models. Stable environments (thousands of generations) produce development or evolution. Social learning (a.k.a cultural adaptation) occurs in variable environments that change slowly. Richerson and Boyd add that it is a mistake to reflect on behavioural ecology without considering cultural environment. Farming methods in diverse communities vary irrespective of physical similarities. Richerson and Boyd believe that cultural tradition explains why methods are used and learned by succeeding generations better than ecological contingency can.
Operant Conditioning by any other name ...
Walter believes that there are important consequences that result as a matter of course in relating cultural evolution to biological evolution. Skinner's perspective recognises that there exist "genetically evolved dimensions that underlie behaviour" (pg. 13). He also believed that although cultural selection differed from natural selection, "no new behavioural process" (pg. 13) was involved suggesting cultural evolution is based on operant conditioning (where behaviour is rewarded or punished for each action until it is associated with either a positive or negative experience). Walter quotes from work Skinner published in 1953: "the culture into which an individual is born is composed of all the variables affecting him which are arranged by other people" (pg. 14). There are elementary processes by which behavioural repertoires develop. Responses may be shaped by social and/or physical environment. Conformity requires regulation of contributed standards to develop a self-sustaining social system.
The chimera of representational content
Skinner states that mental events can be explained and accepted as brain behaviour. It is considered a possibility that concepts of folk psychology (memes of past generations that include beliefs and desires) may be replaced with neurological assertions.
Cognitive theory on dualism stipulate that mental events exist and are represented in separate physical brain events. The materialist asks is it possible to describe brain events in a manner that circumvents the notion that a non-physical dimension exists? Walter notes the difficulty in understanding dualism may lie in articulation because links we use include both psychological and physical terms to determine the experience. Critics argue that it is a new metaphor for connection to describe cognitive process.
The era for representational fantasies of cognitive scientists is over, Walter indicates. Theories based on operational behaviour that link definition to consequence are required. While non-cognitive learning theory is doing this, Walter indicates that Richerson and Boyd are muddying the waters in their exploration of cultural variants.
If the metaphor doesn't fit, don't wear it
Walter suggests that metaphors are by and large unhelpful and views them as distracting and irrelevant. He argues the point by introducing the debate on whether some memes are like viruses (e.g. pernicious effects of religion). Distin argues against the virus concept as memes do not replicate the way that genes do, so there is nothing to hijack. Richerson and Boyd defend the virus as a rogue cultural variant - a self-perpetuating meme that is socially undesirable.
Walter categorises the division of labour between scientists this way: evolutionary biologists/psychologists investigate evolutionary history for proximate mechanisms of behaviour. Neurobiologists and psychologists of learning and conditioning are obliged to investigate how proximate mechanisms function. To determine the nature of what drives and constrains learning requires different tools (mental models, perspectives, etc.). Operant conditioning tools cannot answer why a thing is, or what in evolutionary history or physiology reinforces mechanisms.
Introduction
Walter begins by introducing a brief history of the meme - the cultural counterpart to the gene - introduced as a concept by Dawkins in 1976 and latterly by Lumsden and Wilson in 1981 repackaged as culturgen.
Walter questions whether the meme is useful or adequate in accounting for culture. Critics argue that culture can't be determined the same way that genes can. Walter states that replacing meme theory with culturgen theory will not increase understanding of cultural transmission. How is culture conceptualised, he asks?
Dawkin's definition of a meme is described by Distin as a 'unit of information residing in the brain' that is dependent on representational context. It includes ideas, skills, concepts and procedures that are replicated from one mind to another by way of communication (e.g. farming methods). The external consequences of that unit of information define observable behaviour (phenotypic effects). Walter states that all ideas that have the potential to be transmitted qualify as memes. Ideas that are possible but are not used are referred to as recessive memes. Ideas that are useful will be transmitted. Emotions cannot be counted as memes as they have no representational content. Instead, we are encouraged to think of emotions as reactions to memes. Walter specifically states "[t]he mental representations of other species, and possibly earlier hominid species, also do not qualify as memes. For example, frog representations of flies do not count as memes. In order to qualify, representations have to be sufficiently abstract" (p. 5).
Distin believes that only modern man is capable of understanding representations of representations (meta-representations) and uses simian behaviour as an example. An ape may pull leaves off a twig to fish for termites but does not consider the twig a tool for that purpose. The former is learned behaviour or instrumental behaviour. The latter is a formation of the abstract conceptualisation 'ant dipper'. What is crucial is that the concept can be detached and placed in abstract with other context independent concepts. For example, icanhascheezburger is a meme that uses the concept of animal activity and human thought process to create humour. Dawkins proposed that culture does not solely consist of meta-representations, but culture can be defined by the significant use of such representations.
Walter indicates that complex learning can be achieved through mindless mimicry, but Distin argues that rules are required to structure memes, and social learning is vital to memetic transmission. So only representation that involves social learning is considered to be a meme. Blackmore indicates that cultural transmission occurs through imitation. Distin identifies three kinds of imitation:
- imitation of the surface form of the behaviour;
- imitation of the complex structure of behaviour (distinguishing between component parts of behavioural patterns and those that are identified as reciprocal); and
- imitation formulated in terms of rules or general principles (e.g. recipes).
Critics argue that units of information represented in individuals are not identical to each other. Walter cites Sperber who proposes that three conditions should be met:
- A must cause B;
- A must be identical to B; and
- B must be inherited from A.
It is suggested that individuals cannot perceive the world as it truly is, nor are we perceiving an ideal platonic reality. We create our world through conscious experience, and Distin refers to the meme as an example of Platonic essence. To construct identical instantiations would require conceptualisation through Platonic essences. The categorisation of memes defines its' class. Each representation in individual brains is the experience or units of information that have been received. Walters states that even though individuals gather information from the same source (identity of stimulations), it does not guarantee identity of content. Abstraction of information depends upon individual focus within context.
Similarities that occur in brain events can be measured statistically, Walter indicates. Distin proposes that statistical variations in memes are due to distortions and omissions ('noise'). The ellimination of noise allows the individual to access the true essence of the meme. It is generally accepted that diversity in representations indicates that ideas are not the same as essences. There is undeniable variation in biological systems, Walter states, and messy, empirical variation constitutes Darwin's Dangerous Idea that renders indoctrination in biology and zoology void. Walter refers to Oyama who critiqued the notion that information is passed through DNA and suggests instead that a 'ghost in the gene' exists. Distin applies this reasoning to memes suggesting that information is the 'ghost in the meme'. Genes are representations of observable behaviour through the medium of DNA while memes are representative of the cultural traits. Walter suggests the critical difference is that genes have a specific value that allows copying and memes do not. He adds that genes have a physical manifestation that enable transfer from source to recipient, whereas behaviour generated by thinking is not a shared activity between brains. Memes are the imaginary bridge that connect us.
We know that memes are part of a larger more complex meme, so Walter asks what constitutes learning when nothing is physically transmitted to the brain. What would happen to memetics if we learned without regard for traditional concepts that were originally meant to teach us skills essential to society?
The Richerson and Boyle Variations
Walter investigates an alternative to memetics. Richerson and Boyle indicate information to be a mental state that affects behaviour and is achieved through learning (behaviour includes ideas, beliefs, values, attitudes). Research into the spread and disappearance of cultural variants (unit of culture) will help monitor transmission of the learning process. Walter quotes "culture is taught by motivated teachers, acquired by motivated learners, and stored and manipulated in brains" (pg. 9). Richerson and Boyle simply state that adopting a Darwinian approach to culture is useful when considering cultural variants and their potential similarity to genes.
The differences between Richerson and Boyle's alternative is that cultural variants are not replicators and the particulate claim does not apply when held against Sperber's objections. Rather than being information transmitted from one brain to another, cultural variants generate behaviour that is observed and replicated, "... a population of similar but not identical learned representations" (pg.10).
Cultural Selection and Social Learning
Richerson and Boyd insist that cultural variants are transmitted through what Walter views as social learning methods. Imitation is prevalent among all species, but social learning is highly developed in humans. Richerson and Boyd make the crucial distinction between learning and imitation. Furthermore, they hypothesise the following valuation: if learning is cheap, people will learn; if learning is expensive, imitation will ensue.
Walter makes clear the difference between natural selection and biased transmission. Natural selection is when a predominant culture can have an effect that changes the cultural composition of the population. Biased transmission are cultural variants that are selected for imitation and passed on.
Our culture is unique in that we are the only species to pass down innovation carried by multiple generations. Our learning is cumulative and instead of re-inventing the wheel every generation, we learn from mistakes and successes made in the environment without having to approach it from a basic foundation. Richerson and Boyd argue that imitation facilitates cumulative improvement (time not spent re-inventing the wheel).
So what's the difference between the two, Walter asks. Richerson and Boyd's hypothesis is that early man developed his brain through cultural benefits derived from imitation. Environments that are extremely unstable (variable) are unable to pass on information that is retained in the long term. Mal-adaptive or adverse behaviour is common because of social learning. New non-parental models leave individuals open to manipulation and exploitation unlike traditional parental models. Stable environments (thousands of generations) produce development or evolution. Social learning (a.k.a cultural adaptation) occurs in variable environments that change slowly. Richerson and Boyd add that it is a mistake to reflect on behavioural ecology without considering cultural environment. Farming methods in diverse communities vary irrespective of physical similarities. Richerson and Boyd believe that cultural tradition explains why methods are used and learned by succeeding generations better than ecological contingency can.
Operant Conditioning by any other name ...
Walter believes that there are important consequences that result as a matter of course in relating cultural evolution to biological evolution. Skinner's perspective recognises that there exist "genetically evolved dimensions that underlie behaviour" (pg. 13). He also believed that although cultural selection differed from natural selection, "no new behavioural process" (pg. 13) was involved suggesting cultural evolution is based on operant conditioning (where behaviour is rewarded or punished for each action until it is associated with either a positive or negative experience). Walter quotes from work Skinner published in 1953: "the culture into which an individual is born is composed of all the variables affecting him which are arranged by other people" (pg. 14). There are elementary processes by which behavioural repertoires develop. Responses may be shaped by social and/or physical environment. Conformity requires regulation of contributed standards to develop a self-sustaining social system.
The chimera of representational content
Skinner states that mental events can be explained and accepted as brain behaviour. It is considered a possibility that concepts of folk psychology (memes of past generations that include beliefs and desires) may be replaced with neurological assertions.
Cognitive theory on dualism stipulate that mental events exist and are represented in separate physical brain events. The materialist asks is it possible to describe brain events in a manner that circumvents the notion that a non-physical dimension exists? Walter notes the difficulty in understanding dualism may lie in articulation because links we use include both psychological and physical terms to determine the experience. Critics argue that it is a new metaphor for connection to describe cognitive process.
The era for representational fantasies of cognitive scientists is over, Walter indicates. Theories based on operational behaviour that link definition to consequence are required. While non-cognitive learning theory is doing this, Walter indicates that Richerson and Boyd are muddying the waters in their exploration of cultural variants.
If the metaphor doesn't fit, don't wear it
Walter suggests that metaphors are by and large unhelpful and views them as distracting and irrelevant. He argues the point by introducing the debate on whether some memes are like viruses (e.g. pernicious effects of religion). Distin argues against the virus concept as memes do not replicate the way that genes do, so there is nothing to hijack. Richerson and Boyd defend the virus as a rogue cultural variant - a self-perpetuating meme that is socially undesirable.
Walter categorises the division of labour between scientists this way: evolutionary biologists/psychologists investigate evolutionary history for proximate mechanisms of behaviour. Neurobiologists and psychologists of learning and conditioning are obliged to investigate how proximate mechanisms function. To determine the nature of what drives and constrains learning requires different tools (mental models, perspectives, etc.). Operant conditioning tools cannot answer why a thing is, or what in evolutionary history or physiology reinforces mechanisms.
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